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Nuclear Test Cases
Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France
Judgments of the Court
On 20 December 1974, the International Court of Justice delivered
judgment in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France). By 9
votes to 6, the court found that the claim of New Zealand no longer had any
object and the court was therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon.
In the reasoning of its Judgment, the court adduced, inter alia the following
considerations: Even before turning to the questions of jurisdiction and
admissibility, the Court had first to consider the essentially preliminary
question as to whether a dispute existed and to analyze the claim submitted to
it (paras. 22-24 of Judgment); the proceedings instituted before the Court on
May 1973 concerned the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by
France in the South Pacific (par. 16 of Judgment); the original and ultimate
objective of New Zealand was to obtain a termination of those tests (paras.
25-31 of Judgment); France, by various public statements made in 1974,
announced its intention following the completion of the 1974 series of
atmospheric tests, to cease the conduct of such tests (paras. 33-44 of
Judgment); the Court found that the objective of New Zealand had in effect
been accomplished, inasmuch as France had undertaken the obligation to
hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific (paras.
50-55 of Judgment); the dispute having thus disappeared, the claim no longer
had any object and there was nothing on which to give judgment (paras. 58-62
of Judgment).
Upon the delivery of the Judgment, the order of 22 June 1973 indicating
interim measures of protection ceased to be operative and the measures in
question lapsed (para. 64 of Judgment).
Earlier in the day the Court delivered judgment in the case concerning
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France).
Analysis of the Two Judgments*
PROCEDURE (PARAS. 1-20 OF EACH JUDGMENT)
In its Judgment, the Court recalled that on 9 May 1973 the Applicant
*The analytical summary presented herein was made available by the Registry of the

International Court of Justice.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 3

564 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
instituted proceedings against France in respect of French atmospheric nuclear
tests in the South Pacific. To found the jurisdiction of the Court, the
Application relied on the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes concluded at Geneva in 1928 and Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute of
the Court. By a letter of 16 May 1973 France stated that it considered that the
Court was manifestly not competent in the case, that it could not accept its
jurisdiciton and that it requested the removal of the case from the Court's list.
The Applicant having requested the Court to indicate interim measures of
protection, the Court, by an Order of 22 June 1973, indicated inter alia that,
pending its final decision, France should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit
of radio-active fall-out on the territory of the Applicant. By various
communications the Applicant informed the Court that further series of
atmospheric tests took place in July-August 1973 and June-September 1974.
By the same Order of 22 June 1973, the Court, considering that it was necessary to begin by resolving the questions of the Court's jurisdiction and of the
admissibility of the Application, decided that the proceedings should first be
addressed to these questions. The Applicant filed a Memorial and presented
argument at public hearings. It submitted that the Court had jurisdiction and
that the Application was admissible. France did not file any Counter-Memorial
and was not represented at the hearings; its attitude was defined in the
above-mentioned letter of 16 May 1973.
With regard to the French request that the case be removed from the list-a
request which the Court, in its Order of 22 June 1973, had duly noted while
feeling unable to accede to it at that stage-, the Court observed that it had the
opportunity of examining the request in the light of the subsequent proceedings.
It found that the present case was not one in which the procedure of summary
removal from the list would be appropriate, it was to be regretted that France
had failed to appear in order to put forward its arguments, but the Court
nevertheless had to proceed and reach a conclusion, having regard to the
evidence brought before it and the arguments addressed to it by the Applicant,
and also to any documentary or other evidence which might be relevant.
OBJECT OF THE CLAIM (PARAS. 21-41 OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE
AUSTRALIAN CASE, AND 21-44 IN THE NEW ZEALAND CASE)
The present phase of the proceedings concerned the jurisdiction of the Court
and admissibility of the Application. In examining such questions, the Court
was entitled, and in some circumstances may be required, to go into other
questions which may not be strictly capable of classification as matters of
jurisdiction or admissibility but are of such a nature as to require examination
in priority to those matters. By virtue of an inherent jurisdiction which the Court
possesses qua judicial organ, it had first to examine a question which it found to
be essentially preliminary, namely the existence of a dispute, for, whether or not
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the Court had jurisdiction in the present case, the resolution of that question
could exert a decisive influence on the continuation of the proceedings. It was
therefore necessary for it to make a detailed analysis of the claim submitted in
the Application, which is required by Article 40 of the Statute to indicate the
subject of the dispute.
In its Application, Australia asked the Court:
to adjudge and declare that "the carrying out of further atmospheric nuclear weapon
tests in the South Pacific Ocean is not consistent with applicable rules of international
law" and to order "that the French Republic shall not carry out any further such
tests."
New Zealand, in its Application, asked the Court:
to adjudge and declare: That the conduct by the French Government of nuclear tests
in the South Pacific region that give rise to radio-active fall-out constitutes a violation
of New Zealand's rights under international law, and that these rights will be violated
hy any further such tests.
It was essential to consider whether the Applicant requested a judgment
which would only state the legal relationship between the Parties or a judgment
requiring one of the Parties to take, or refrain from taking, some action. The
Court had the power to interpret the submissions of the Parties and to exclude,
when necessary, certain elements which are to be viewed, not as indications of
what the Party is asking the Court to decide, but as reasons advanced why it
should decide in the sense contended for. In the present case, if account was
taken of the Application as a whole, the diplomatic exchanges between the
Parties in recent years, the arguments of the Applicant before the Court and the
public statements made on its behalf during and after the oral proceedings, it
became evident that the Applicant's original and ultimate objective was and had
remained to obtain a termination of French atmospheric nuclear tests in the
South Pacific.
In these circumstances, the Court was bound to take note of further
developments, both prior to and subsequent to the close of the oral proceedings,
namely certain public statements by French authorities, of which some were
mentioned before the Court at public hearings and others were made
subsequently. It would have been possible for the Court, had it considered that
the interests of justice so required, to have afforded the Parties the opportunity,
e.g., by reopening the oral proceedings, of addressing to the Court comments
on the statements made since the close of those proceedings. Such a course,
however, would have been justified only if the matter dealt with in those
statements had been completely new or had not been raised during the
proceedings, which was manifestly not the case. The Court was in possession not
only of the statements made by the French authorities in question but also of the
views of the Applicant on them.
The first of these statements was contained in a communiqu6 which was
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 3

566 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
issued by the Office of the President of the French Republic on 8 June 1974 and
transmitted in particular to the Applicant: ". . . in view of the stage reached in
carrying out the French nuclear defence programme France will be in a position
to pass on to the stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests
planned for this summer is completed." Further statements were contained in a
Note from the French Embassy in Wellington (10 June), a letter from the
President of France to the Prime Minister of New Zealand (1 July), a press
conference given by the President of the Republic (25 July), a speech made by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the United Nations General -Assembly (25
September) and a television interview and press conference by the Minister for
Defence (16 August and 11 October). The Court considered that these
statements conveyed an announcement by France of its intention to cease the
conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests following the conclusion of the 1974 series.
With respect to this series of statements and their legal implications, the text
of the Court's opinion was as follows (para. 35ff. of the judgment in New
Zealand v. France):
35. It will be convenient to take the statements referred to above in
chronological order. The first statement is contained in the communique issued
by the Office of the President of the French Republic on 8 June 1974, shortly
before the commencement of the 1974 series of French nuclear tests:
The Decree reintroducing the security measures in the South Pacific nuclear test zone
has been published in the Official Journal of 8 June 1974.
The Office of the President of the Republic takes this opportunity of stating that in
view of the stage reached in carrying out the French nuclear defence programme
France will be in a position to pass on to the stage of underground explosions as soon
as the series of tests planned for this summer is completed.
36. The second is contained in a Note of 10 June 1974 from the French
Embassy in Wellington to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
It should . . . be pointed out that the decision taken by the Office of the President of
the French Republic to have the opening of the nuclear test series preceded by a press
communique represents a departure from the practice of previous years. This
procedure has been chosen in view of the fact that a new element has intervened in the
development of the programme for perfecting the French deterrent force. This new
element is as follows: France, at the point which has been reached in the execution of
its programme of defence by nuclear means, will be in a position to move to the stage
of underground firings as soon as the test series planned for this summer is completed.
Thus the atmospheric tests which will be carried out shortly will, in the normal
course of events, be the last of this type.

The French authorities express the hope that the New Zealand Government will find
this information of some interest and will wish to take it into consideration.
37. As indicated by counsel for the applicant at the hearing of 10 July 1974,
the reaction of the New Zealand Prime Minister to this second statement was
expressed in a letter to the President of the French Republic dated 11 June 1974,
from which the following are two extracts:
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• . . I have noted that the terms of the announcement do not represent an unqualified
renunciation of atmospheric testing for the future.
I would hope that even at this stage you would be prepared to weigh the implications of
any further atmospheric testing in the Pacific and resolve to put an end to this activity
which has been the source of grave anxiety to the people in the Pacific region for more
than a decade.
Thus the phrase "in the normal course of events" was regarded by New Zealand
as qualifying the statement made, so that it did not meet the expectations of the
Applicant, which evidently regarded those words as a form of escape clause.
This is clear from the observations of counsel for New Zealand at the hearing
of 10 July 1974. In a Note of 17 June 1974, the New Zealand Embassy in Paris
stated that it had good reason to believe that France had carried out an
atmospheric nuclear test on 16 June and made this further comment:
The announcement that France will proceed to underground tests in 1975, while
presenting a new development, does not affect New Zealand's fundamental opposition
to all nuclear testing, nor does it in any way reduce New Zealand's position to the
atmospheric tests set down for this year: the more so since the French Government is
unable to give firm assurances that no atmospheric testing will be undertaken after
1974.
38. The third French statement is contained in a reply made on 1 July 1974
by the President of the Republic to the New Zealand Prime Minister's letter of
11 June:
In present circumstances, it is at least gratifying for me to note the positive reaction in
your letter to the announcement in the communiqu6 of 8 June 1974 that we are going
over to underground tests. There is in this a new element whose importance will not, I
trust, escape the New Zealand Government.
39. These three statements were all drawn to the notice of the Court by the
Applicant at the time of the oral proceedings. As already indicated, the Court
will also have to consider the relevant statements subsequently made by the
French authorities: on 25 July 1974 by the President of the Republic; on 16
August 1974 by the Minister of Defence; on 25 September 1974 by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs in the United Nations General Assembly; and on 11 October
1974 by the Minister of Defence.
40. The next statement to be considered, therefore, will be that made on 25
July at a press conference given by the President of the Republic, when he said:
...on this question of nuclear tests, you know that the Prime Minister had publicly
expressed himself in the National Assembly in his speech introducing the
Government's programme. He had indicated that French nuclear testing would
continue. I had myself made it clear that this round of atmospheric tests would be the
last, and so the members of the Government were completely informed of our
intentions in this respect ...
41. On 16 August 1974, in the course of an interview on French television, the
Minister of Defence said that the French Government had done its best to
ensure that the 1974 nuclear tests would be the last atmospheric tests.
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42. On 25 September 1974, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
addressing the United Nations General Assembly, said:
We have now reached a stage in our nuclear technology that makes it possible for us to
continue our programme by underground testing, and we have taken steps to do so as
early as next year.
43. On 11 October 1974, the Minister of Defence held a press conference
during which he stated twice, in almost identical terms, that there would not be
any atmospheric tests in 1975 and that France was ready to proceed to
underground tests. When the comment was made that he had not added "in the
normal course of events," he agreed that he had not. This latter point is relevant
in view of the Note of 10 June 1974 from the French Embassy in Wellington to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand (paragraph 36 above), to the
effect that the atmospheric tests contemplated "will, in the normal course of
events, be the last of this type." The Minister also mentioned that, whether or
not other governments had been officially advised of the decision, they could
become aware of it through the press and by reading the communiques issued
by the Office of the President of the Republic.
44. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the communique issued on 8
June 1974 (paragraph 35 above), the French Embassy's Note of 10 June 1974
(paragraph 36 above) and the President's letter of 1 July 1974 (paragraph 38)
conveyed to New Zealand the announcement that France, following the
conclusion of the 1974 series of tests, would cease the conduct of atmospheric
nuclear tests. Special attention is drawn to the hope expressed in the Note of 10
June 1974 "that the New Zealand Government will find this information of some
interest and will wish to take it into consideration," and the reference in that
Note and in the letter of 1 July 1974 to "a new element" whose importance is
urged upon the New Zealand Government. The Court must consider in
particular the President's statement of 25 July 1974 (paragraph 40 above)
followed by the Defence Minister's statement of 11 October 1974 (paragraph
43). These reveal that the official statements made on behalf of France
concerning future nuclear testing are not subject to whatever proviso, if any,
was implied by the expression "in the normal course of events [normalement]."
45. Before considering whether the declarations made by the French
authorities meet the object of the claim by the Applicant that no further
atmospheric nuclear tests should be carried out in the South Pacific, it is first
necessary to determine the status and scope on the international plane of these
declarations.
46. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific.
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
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become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration
the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In
these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any
subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since a requirement
would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by
which the pronouncement by the State was made.
47. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose
to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention
of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act.
When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited,
a restrictive interpretation is called for.
48. With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not
a domain in which international law imposes any special or strict requirements.
Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference,
for such statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments
in international law, which does not require that they should be couched in
written form. Thus the question of form is not decisive. As the Court said in its
Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear:
Where . . . as is generally the case in international law, which places the principal
emphasis on the intention of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties
are free to choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results from it.
(LC.J.Reports 1961, p. 31.)
The Court further stated in the same case: "...
the sole relevant question is
whether the language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear
intention. . ." (Ibid., p. 32).
49. One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of
legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and
confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age
when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as
the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith,
so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by
unilateral declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral
declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the
obligation thus created be respected.
50. Having examined the legal principles involved, the Court will now turn to
the particular statements made by the French Government. The Government of
New Zealand has made known to the Court its own interpretation of some of
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these statements at the oral proceedings (paragraph 27 above). As to
subsequent statements, reference may be made to what was said by the Prime
Minister of New Zealand on 1 Novermber 1974 (paragraph 28 above). It will be
observed that New Zealand has recognized the possibility of the dispute being
resolved by a unilateral declaration, of the kind specified above, on the part of
France. In the public statement of 1 November 1974, it is stated that "Until we
have an assurance that nuclear testing of this kind is finished for good, the
dispute between New Zealand and France persists." This is based on the view
that "the option of further atmospheric tests has been left open." The Court
must however form its own view of the meaning and scope intended by the
author of a unilateral declaration which may create a legal obligation, and
cannot in this respect be bound by the view expressed by another State which is
in no way a party to the text.
51. Of the statements by the French Government now before the Court, the
most essential are clearly those made by the President of the Republic. There
can be no doubt, in view of his functions, that his public communications or
statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international relations acts
of the French State. His statements, and those of members of the French
Government acting under his authority, up to the last statement made by the
Minister of Defence (of 11 October 1974), constitute a whole. Thus, in whatever
form these statements were expressed, they must be held to constitute an
engagement of the State, having regard to their intention and to the
circumstances in which they were made.
52. The unilateral statements of the French authorities were made outside the
Court, publicly and erga omnes, even if some of them were communicated to the
Government of New Zealand. As was observed above, to have legal effect, there
was no need for these statements to be addressed to a particular State, nor was
acceptance by any other State required. The general nature and characteristics
of these statements are decisive for the evaluation of the legal implications, and
it is to the interpretation of the statements that the Court must now proceed.
The Court is entitled to presume, at the outset, that these statements were made
in vacuo, but in relation to the tests which constitute the very object of the
present proceedings, although France has not appeared in the case.
53. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last,
the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant,
its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that
other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being
effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be
considered within the general framework of the security of international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations
among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements and from the
circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 3

JudicialDecisions 571
unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and
they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court
holds that they consitutute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court
considers that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective
cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international
community to which his words were addressed. It is true that the French
Government has consistently maintained that its nuclear experiments do not
contravene any subsisting provision of international law, nor did France
recognize that it was bound by any rule of international law to terminate its
tests, but this does not affect the legal consequences of the statements examined
above. The Court finds that the unilateral undertaking resulting from these
statements cannot be interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance on an
arbitrary power of reconsideration. The Court finds further that the French
Government has undertaken an obligation the precise nature and limits of
which must be understood in accordance with the actual terms in which they
have been publicly expressed.
54. The Court will now confront the commitment entered into by France with
the claim advanced by the Applicant. Though the latter has formally requested
from the Court a finding on the rights and obligations of the Parties, it has
throughout the dispute maintained as its final objective the termination of the
tests. It has sought from France an assurance that the French programme of
atmospheric nuclear testing would come to an end. While expressing its
opposition to the 1974 tests, the Government of New Zealand made specific
reference to an assurance that "1974 will see the end of atmospheric nuclear
testing in the South Pacific" (paragraph 33 above). On more than one occasion
it has indicated that it would be ready to accept such an assurance. Since the
Court now finds that a commitment in this respect has been entered into by
France, there is no occasion for a pronouncement in respect of rights and
obligations of the Parties concerning the past-which in other circumstances
the Court would be entitled and even obliged to make-whatever the date by
reference to which such pronouncement might be made.
55. Thus the Court faces a situation in which the objective of the Applicant
has in effect been accomplished, inasmuch as the Court finds that France has
undertaken the obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in
the South Pacific.
56. This conclusion is not affected by a reference made by the New Zealand
Government, in successive diplomatic Notes to the French Government from
1966 to 1974, to a formal reservation of "the right to hold the French
Government responsible for any damage or losses received by New
Zealand ... as a result of any nuclear weapons tests conducted by France"; for
no mention of any request for damages is made in the Application, and at the
public hearing of 10 July 1974 the Attorney-General of New Zealand specifically
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stated: "My Government seeks a halt to a hazardous and unlawful activity, and
not compensation for its continuance." The Court therefore finds that no
question of damages in respect of tests already conducted arises in the present
case.
57. It must be assumed that had New Zealand received an assurance, on one
of the occasions when this was requested, which, in its interpretation, would
have been satisfactory, it would have considered the dispute as concluded and
would have discontinued the proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court.
If it has not done so, this does not prevent the Court from making its own
independent finding on the subject. It is true that "the Court cannot take into
account declarations, admissions or proposals which the Parties may have made
during direct negotiations between themselves, when such negotiations have not
led to a complete agreement" (Factoryat Chorzow (Merits), P. C.LJ., Series A,
No. 17, p. 51). However, in the present case, that is not the situation before the
Court. The Applicant has clearly indicated what would satisfy its claim, and the
Respondent has independently taken action; the question for the Court is thus
one of interpretation of the conduct of each of the Parties. The conclusion at
which the Court has arrived as a result of such interpretation does not mean that
it is itself effecting a compromise of the claim; the Court is merely ascertaining
the object of the claim and the effect of the Respondent's action, and this it is
obliged to do. Any suggestion that the dispute would not be capable of being
terminated by statements made on behalf of France would run counter to the
unequivocally expressed views of the Applicant both before the Court and
elsewhere.
58. The Court, as a court of law, is called upon to resolve existing disputes
between States. Thus the existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the
Court to exercise its judicial function; it is not sufficient for one party to assert
that there is a dispute, since "Whether there exists an international dispute is a
matter for objective determination" by the Court (Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria,Hungary and Romania (FirstPhase), Advisory Opinion,
I. C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). The dispute brought before it must therefore
continue to exist at the time when the Court makes its decision. It must not fail to
take cognizance of a situation in which the dispute has disappeared because the
final objective which the Applicant has maintained throughout has been
achieved by other means. If the declarations of France concerning the effective
cessation of the nuclear tests have the significance described by the Court, that
is to say if they have caused the dispute to disappear, all the necessary
consequences must be drawn from this finding.
59. It may be argued that although France may have undertaken such an
obligation, by a unilateral declaration, not to carry out atmospheric nuclear
tests in the South Pacific region, a judgment of the Court on this subject might
still be of value because, if the Judgment upheld the Applicant's contentions, it
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would reinforce the position of the Applicant by affirming the obligation of the
Respondent. However, the Court having found that the Respondent has
assumed an obligation as to conduct, concerning the effective cessation of
nuclear tests, no further judicial action is required. The Applicant has
repeatedly sought from the Respondent an assurance that the tests would cease,
and the Respondent has, on its own initiative, made a series of statements to the
effect that they will cease. Thus the Court concludes that, the dispute having
disappeared, the claim advanced by New Zealand no longer has an object. It
follows that any further finding would have no raison d'etre.
60. This is not to say that the Court may select from the cases submitted to it
those it feels suitable for judgment while refusing to give judgment in others.
Article 38 of the Court's Statute provides that its function is "to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it"; but not
only Article 38 itself but other provisions of the Statute and Rules also make it
clear that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in contentious proceedings only
when a dispute genuinely exists between the parties. In refraining from further
action in this case the Court is therefore merely acting in accordance with the
proper interpretation of its judicial function.
61. The Court has in the past indicated considerations which would lead it to
decline to give judgment. The present case is one in which "circumstances that
have . . . arisen render any adjudication devoid of purpose" (Northern
Cameroons, Judgment,L C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38). The Court therefore sees no
reason to allow the continuance of proceedings which it knows are bound to be
fruitless. While judicial settlement may provide a path to international harmony
in circumstances of conflict, it is none the less true that the needless
continuance of litigation is an obstacle to such harmony.
62. Thus the Court finds that no further pronouncement is required in the
present case. It does not enter into the adjudicatory functions of the Court to
deal with issues in abstracto,once it has reached the conclusion that the merits of
the case no longer fall to be determined. The object of the claim having clearly
disappeared, there is nothing on which to give judgment.

63. Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment
concerning its future conduct it is not the Court's function to contemplate that it
will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this
Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of
the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute; the denunciation
by France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction
in the present case, cannot constitute by itself an obstacle to the presentation
of such a request.
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64. In its above-mentioned Order of 22 June 1973, the Court stated that the
provisional measures therein set out were indicated "pending its final decision in
the proceedings instituted on 9 May 1973 by New Zealand against France." It
follows that such Order ceases to be operative upon the delivery of the present
Judgment, and that the provisional measures lapse at the same time.

65. For these reasons,
THE COURT,

by nine votes to six,
finds that the claim of New Zealand no longer has any object and that the Court
is therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of December, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-four, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of New
Zealand and the Government of the French Republic, respectively.
(Signed) Manfred LACHS,
President.
(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

JUDGES FORSTER, GROS, PETREN and IGNACIO-PINTO append separate

opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
Judges ONYEAMA, DILLARD, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA and Sir Humphrey
WALDOCK append a joint dissenting opinion, and Judge DE CASTRO and Judge

ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICK append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the
Court.
(Initialled)M.L.
(Initialled)S.A.
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